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Abstract
Recent studies by police departments and researchers confirm that police stop racial and
ethnic minority citizens more often than whites, relative to their proportions in the population. However, it has been argued that stop rates more accurately reflect rates of crimes
committed by each ethnic group, or that stop rates reflect elevated rates in specific social areas such as neighborhoods or precincts. Most of the research on stop rates and police-citizen
interactions has focused on traffic stops, and analyses of pedestrian stops are rare. In this
paper, we analyze data from 125,000 pedestrian stops by the New York Police Department
over a fifteen-month period. We disaggregate stops by police precinct, and compare stop
rates by racial and ethnic group controlling for previous race-specific arrest rates. We use
hierarchical multilevel models to adjust for precinct-level variability, thus directly addressing the question of geographic heterogeneity that arises in the analysis of pedestrian stops.
We find that persons of African and Hispanic descent were stopped more frequently than
whites, even after controlling for precinct variability and race-specific estimates of crime
participation.
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Introduction: bias in police stops?

In the late 1990s, popular, legal, and political concerns were raised across the U.S. about
police harassment of minority groups in their everyday encounters with law enforcement.
These concerns focused on the extent to which police were stopping people on the highways
for “driving while black” (see Weitzer, 2000, Harris, 2002, and Lundman and Kaufman,
2003). Additional concerns were raised about racial bias in pedestrian stops of citizens by
police predicated on “zero tolerance” policies to control quality-of-life crimes, and policing
strategies concentrated in minority communities that targeted illegal gun possession and
drug trafficking (see Fagan, Zimring and Kim, 1998, Greene, 1999, Skolnick and Caplovitz,
2001, Fagan and Davies, 2000, 2003, Fagan, 2002, and Gould and Mastrofski, 2004). These
practices prompted angry reactions among minority citizens that widened the breach between different racial/ethnic groups in their trust in the police (Lundman and Kaufman,
2003, Tyler and Huo, 2003, and Weitzer and Tuch, 2002), provoking a crisis of legitimacy
with legal, moral and political dimensions (see Wang, 2001, Russell, 2002, and Harris, 2002).
In an era of declining crime rates, policy debates on policing strategies often pivot on
the evaluation of New York City’s policing strategy during the 1990s, a strategy designed on
aggressive stops and searches of pedestrians for a wide range of crimes (Eck and Maguire,
2000, Skogan and Frydl, 2004). The policy was based on the lawful practice of “temporarily
detaining, questioning, and, at times, searching civilians on the street” (Spitzer, 1999). The
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled police stop-and-frisk procedures to be constitutional under
certain restrictions (Terry v. Ohio, 1968). The NYPD’s approach during the 1990s has been
widely credited as a major source of the City’s sharp crime decline (Zimring, 2006).
But near the end of the decade there were repeated complaints of harassment of minority
communities, especially by the elite Street Crimes Unit (Spitzer, 1999). These complaints
came in the context of the well-publicized assault by police of Abner Louima and the
shootings of Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond. Citizen complaints about aggressive
“stop and frisk” tactics ultimately provoked civil litigation that alleged racial bias in the
patterns of “stop and frisk,” leading to a settlement that regulated the use of this tactic and
established extensive monitoring requirements (Kelvin Daniels v. City of New York, 2004).
We address this dispute by estimating the extent of racially disparate impacts of what
came to be known as the “New York strategy.” We analyze the rates at which New Yorkers
of different ethnic groups were stopped by the police on the city streets, to assess the central
claim that race-specific stop rates reflect nothing more than race-specific crime rates. This
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study is based on work performed with the New York State Attorney General’s Office
(Spitzer, 1999) and reviewed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2000). Key statistical
issues are the baselines used to compare rates (recognized as a problem by Miller, 2000,
Walker, 2001, and Smith and Alpert, 2002) and local variation in the intensity of policing (as
performed by the Street Crimes Unit and implicitly recommended by Wilson and Kelling,
1982, and others). We use multilevel modeling (see Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, for an
overview and Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997, Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999,
and Weidner, Frase, and Pardoe, 2004, for examples in studies of crime) to adjust for local
variation in comparing the rates of police stops of different ethnic groups in New York City.
Were the police disproportionately stopping ethnic minorities? We address this question
in several different ways using data on police stops, and we conclude that members of
minority groups were stopped more often than whites, both in comparison to their overall
population and to the estimated rates of crime they have committed. We do not, however,
necessarily conclude that the NYPD engaged in discriminatory practices. The summary
statistics we study here cannot directly address questions of harassment or discrimination
but rather reveal statistical patterns that are relevant to these questions.
Because this is a controversial topic that has been studied in a variety ways, we go into
some detail in Sections 2 and 3 on the historical background and available data. Our models
and results appear Sections 4 and 5 present our models, with discussion in Section 6.

2

Background

2.1

Race, neighborhoods, and police stops

Nearly a century of legal and social trends set the stage for the current debate on race
and policing. Historically, close surveillance by police has been a part of everyday life for
African Americans and other minority groups (see, for example, Musto, 1973, and Kennedy,
1997). More recently, in U.S. v. Whren (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the use of
race as a basis for a police stop as long as there were other factors that motivated the stop.
In Brown v. Oneonta (2002), a federal district court permitted the use of race as a search
criterion if there was an explicit racial description of the suspect.
The legal standard for police conduct in citizen stops derives from Terry v. Ohio (1968),
which involved a pedestrian stop that set the parameters of the “reasonable suspicion”
standard for police conduct in detaining citizens for search or arrest. Recently, the courts
have expanded the concept of “reasonable suspicion” to include location as well as behavior.
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For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) noted that, although
a person’s presence in a “high crime area” does not meet the standard for a particularized
suspicion of criminal activity, a location’s characteristics are relevant to determining if a
behavior is sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Since “high crime areas”
often have high concentrations of minority citizens (Massey and Denton, 1993), this logic
places minority neighborhoods at risk for elevating the suspiciousness of their residents.
Early studies suggested that both the racial characteristics of the suspect and the racial
composition of the suspect’s neighborhood influence police decisions to stop, search, or
arrest a suspect (Reiss, 1971, Bittner, 1976). Particularly in urban areas, suspect race
interacts with neighborhood characteristics to animate the formation of suspicion among
police officers (Thompson, 1999, Smith et al., 2006). Alpert et al. (2005) find that police
are more likely to view a minority citizen as suspicious—leading to a police stop—based on
non-behavioral cues, while relying on behavioral cues to develop suspicion for white citizens.
But police also may substitute racial characteristics of communities for racial characteristics of individuals in their cognitive schema of suspicion, resulting in elevated stop rates in
neighborhoods with high concentrations of minorities. For example, in a study of policing
in three cities, Smith (1986) showed that suspects in poor neighborhoods were more likely
to be arrested, in an analysis controlling for suspect behavior and type of crime. Suspects’
race and racial composition of the suspect’s neighborhood were also significant predictors of
police response. Coercive police responses may relate to the perception that poor neighborhoods may have limited capacity for social control and self-regulation. This strategy was
formalized in the influential “Broken Windows” essay of Wilson and Kelling (1982), who
argued that police responses to disorder were critical to communicate intolerance for crime
and to halt its contagious spread. This claim has been disputed, however (see Harcourt,
1998, 2001, Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999, and Taylor, 2000), who argue that race is
often used as a substitute for neighborhood conditions as a marker of suspicion by police.
Police have defended racially disparate patterns of stops on the grounds that minorities
commit disproportionately more crimes than whites (especially the types of crimes that
capture the attention of police), and that the spatial concentration and disparate impacts
of crimes committed by and against minorities justifies more aggressive enforcement in
minority communities (MacDonald, 2001). Police cite such differences in crime rates to
justify racial imbalances even in situations where they have a wide range of possible targets
or where suspicion of criminal activity would not otherwise justify a stop or search (Kennedy,
1997, Harcourt, 2001, Rudovsky, 2001). Using this logic, police claim that the higher stop
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rates of African Americans and other minorities simply represent reasonable and efficient
police practice (see, for example, Bratton and Knobler, 1998, and Goldberg, 1999). Police
often point to the high rates of seizures of contraband, weapons, and fugitives in such stops,
and also to a reduction of crime, to justify such aggressive policing (Kelling and Cole, 1996).
Whether racially disparate stop rates reflect disproportionate crime rates or intentional,
racially biased targeting by police of minorities at rates beyond what any racial differences
in crime rates might justify, is the heart of the social and legal controversy on racial profiling and racial discrimination by police (Fagan, 2002, Ayres, 2002a, Harris, 2002). This
controversy has been the focus of public and private litigation (Rudovsky, 2001), political
mobilization, and self-scrutiny by several police departments (see Garrett, 2001, Walker,
2001, Skolnick and Caplovitz, 2002, and Gross and Livingston, 2002).

2.2

Approaches to studying data on police stops

Recent evidence supports perceptions among minority citizens that police disproportionately stop African American and Hispanic motorists, and that once stopped, these citizens
are more likely to be searched or arrested (Cole, 1999, Veneiro and Zoubeck, 1999, Harris,
1999, Zingraff et al., 2000, Gross and Barnes, 2002). For example, two surveys with nationwide probability samples, completed in 1999 and in 2002, showed that African-Americans
were far more likely than others to report being stopped on the highways by police (Langan
et al., 2001, Durose et al., 2005). Both surveys showed that minority drivers also were more
likely to report being ticketed, arrested, handcuffed, or searched by police, and that they
more often were threatened with force or had force used against them. These disparities
exact social costs that, according to Loury (2002), animate culturally meaningful forms of
stigma that reinforce racial inequalities, especially in the practice of law enforcement.
“Suspicious behavior” is the spark for both pedestrian and traffic stops (Alpert et al.,
2005). Pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing, used to enforce narcotics and
weapons laws, to identify fugitives or other persons for whom warrants may be outstanding,
to investigate reported crimes and “suspicious” behavior, and to improve community quality
of life. For the NYPD, a “stop” intervention provides an occasion for the police to have
contact with persons presumably involved in low-level criminality without having to effect
a formal arrest, and under the lower constitutional standard of “reasonable suspicion”
(Spitzer, 1999). Indeed, because low-level “quality of life” and misdemeanor offenses were
more likely to be committed in the open, the “reasonable suspicion” standard is more easily
satisfied in these sorts of crimes (Rudovsky, 2001).
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However, in pedestrian and traffic violations, the range of suspicious behaviors in neighborhood policing is broad enough to challenge efforts to identify an appropriate baseline to
which to compare race-specific stop rates (see Miller, 2000, Smith and Alpert, 2002, and
Gould and Mastrofski, 2004). Accordingly, attributing bias is difficult: causal claims about
discrimination would require far more information about such baselines than the typical
administrative (observational) datasets can supply. Research in situ that relies on direct
observation of police behavior (e.g., Gould and Mastrofski, 2004, Alpert et al., 2005) requires
officers to articulate the reasons for their actions, a task that is vulnerable to numerous validity threats. Instead, reliable evidence of ethnic bias would require experimental designs
that control for other factors so as to isolate differences in outcomes that could only be attributed to race or ethnicity. Such experiments are routinely used in tests of discrimination
in housing and employment (see, for example, Pager, 2003). But observational studies that
lack such controls are often embarrassed by omitted variable biases: few studies can control
for all the variables that police consider in deciding whether to stop or search someone.
Another approach to studying racial disparities bypasses the question of whether police
intend to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or race, and instead focuses on disparate
impacts of police stop strategies. In this approach, comparisons of “hit rates,” or efficiencies
in the proportion of stops that yield positive results, serve as evidence of disparate impacts
of police stops. This approach can show when the racial disproportionality a particular
policy or decision-making outcome is not justified by heightened institutional productivity.
In the context of profiling, outcome tests assume that the ex post probability that a police
search will uncover drugs or other contraband is a function of the degree of probable cause
that police use in deciding to stop and search a suspect (Ayres, 2002a). If searches of
minorities are less productive than searches of whites, this could be evidence that police
have a lower threshold of probable cause when searching minorities. At the very least, it is
a sign of differential treatment of minorities that in turn produces a disparate impact.
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) consider this “hit rate” approach theoretically as well
as empirically in a study finding that, of the drivers on Interstate 95 in Maryland stopped
by police on suspicion of drug trafficking, African Americans were as likely as the whites to
have drugs in their cars. The accompanying theoretical analysis posits a dynamic process
that considers both the behaviors of police and citizens of different races, and integrates
their decisions in an equilibrium where police calibrate their behavior to the probabilities
of detecting illegal behavior, and citizens in different racial groups adjust their propensities
to accommodate the likelihood of detection. They concluded that the search for drugs was
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an efficient allocation of police resources, despite the disparate impacts of these stops on
minority citizens (Lamberth, 1997, Ayres, 2002a,b, Gross and Barnes, 2002).
However, this analysis omits several factors that might bias these claims, such as racial
differences in the attributes that police consider when deciding which motorists to stop,
search, or arrest (see, for example, Alpert et al., 2005, Smith, Makarios and Alpert, 2006).
Moreover, the randomizing equilibrium assumptions in the Persico et al. approach—that
both police and potential offenders adjust their behavior in response to the joint probabilities
of carrying contraband and being stopped—tend to average across heterogeneous conditions
both in police decision making and offenders’ propensities to crime (Dharmapala and Ross,
2004), and discount the effects of race-specific sensitivities toward crime decisions under
varying conditions of detection risk via police stop (Dominitz and Knowles, 2005). When
these two concerns are addressed, Dharmapala and Ross (2004) identify different equilibria
that lead to different conclusions about racial prejudice in police stops and searches.
We consider hit rates briefly (see Section 5.3), but our main analysis attempts to resolve
these supply-side or omitted-variable problems by controlling for race-specific rates of the
targeted behaviors in patrolled areas, assessing whether stop and search rates exceed what
we would predict from knowledge of the crime rates of different racial groups. This approach
indexes stop behavior to observables about the probability of crime or guilt among different
racial groups. Moreover, by disaggregating data across neighborhoods, our probability
estimates explicitly incorporate the externalities of neighborhood and race that historically
have been observed in policing (Skogan and Frydl, 2004). This approach requires estimates
of the supply of individuals who are engaged in the targeted behaviors (see Miller, 2000,
Fagan and Davies, 2000, Walker, 2001, and Smith and Alpert, 2002).
To be sure, a finding that police are stopping and searching minorities at a higher rate
than is justified by their crime participation does not require that we infer that police
engaged in disparate treatment—but, at a minimum, it is evidence that whatever criteria
the police employed produced an unjustified disparate impact.

3
3.1

Data
“Stop and frisk” in New York City

The New York Police Department has a policy of keeping records on stops (on “UF-250
Forms”), and this information was collated for all stops (about 175,000 in total) from
January, 1998, through March, 1999 (Spitzer, 1999). The police are not required to fill out
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the form for every stop. There are certain conditions under which the police are required
to fill out the form, and these “mandated stops” represent 72% of the stops recorded, with
the remaining reports being of stops for which reporting was optional. To address concerns
about possible selection bias in the nonmandated stops, we repeated our main analyses
(shown in Figure 2) for the mandated stops only, and the total rates of stops changed, but
the relative rates for different ethnic groups remained essentially unchanged.
The UF-250 form has a place for the police officer to record the “Factors Which Caused
Officer to Reasonably Suspect Person Stopped (include information from third persons and
their identity, if known).” We examined these forms and the reasons for the stops for a
citywide sample of 5,000 cases, along with 10,869 others, representing 50% of the cases in a
non-random sample of 8 of the 75 police precincts, chosen to represent a spectrum of racial
population characteristics, crime problems and stop rates, guided by the policy questions
in the original study (Spitzer, 1999: 158). The following examples (from Spitzer, 1999)
illustrate the rules that motivated police decisions to stop suspects, and show the social and
behavioral factors that police apply in the process of forming reasonable suspicion:
“At TPO [time and place of occurrence] male was with person who fit description
of person wanted for GLA [grand larceny auto] in 072 pct. log . . . upon approach
male discarded small coin roller which contained 5 bags of alleged crack.”
“At T/P/O R/O [reporting officer] did observe below named person along w/3
others looking into numerous parked vehicles. R/O did maintain surveillance
on individuals for approx. 20 min. Subjects subsequently stopped to questioned
[sic] w/ neg results.”
“Slashing occurred at Canal street; person fit description; person was running.”
“Several men getting in and out of a vehicle several times.”
“Def. Did have on a large bubble coat with a bulge in right pocket.”
“Person stopped did stop [sic] walking and reverse direction upon seeing police.
Attempted to enter store as police approached; Frisked for safety.”
Based on Federal and state law, some of these reasons for stopping a person are constitutional and some are not. For example, courts have ruled that a bulge in the pocket is not
enough reason for the police to stop a person without his or her consent (People v. DeBour,
8

1976, People v. Holmes, 1996), and that walking away from the police is not a sufficient
reason to stop and frisk a person (Brown v. Texas, 1979, but see Illinois v. Wardlow, 2000).
However, if the police observe illegal activity, weapons (including “waistband bulges”), a
person who fits a description, or suspicious behavior in a crime area, then stops and frisks
have been ruled constitutional (Spitzer, 1999).
The New York State Attorney General’s office used rules such as these to characterize
the rationales for 61% of the stops in the sample as articulating a “reasonable suspicion”
that would justify a lawful stop, 15% of the stops as not articulating a reasonable suspicion,
and 24% as giving insufficient information to decide. For the controversial Street Crimes
Unit, 23% of stops were judged to not articulate a reasonable suspicion. (There was no
strong pattern by ethnicity here: the rate of stops judged to be unreasonable were about
the same for all ethnic groups.) The stops judged to be without “reasonable suspicion”
indeed seemed to be weaker, in that only 1 in 29 of these stops led to arrests, as compared
to 1 in 7 of the stops with reasonable suspicion.

3.2

Aggregate rates of stops for each ethnic group

With this as background, we analyze the entire stop-and-frisk dataset to see to what extent
different ethnic groups were stopped by the police. We focus on blacks (African-Americans),
hispanics (Latinos), and whites (European-Americans). The categories are as recorded by
the police making the stops. We exclude members of other ethnic groups (about 4% of the
stops) because of the likelihood of ambiguities in classifications. (With such a low frequency
of “other,” even a small rate of misclassification can cause large distortions in the estimates
for that group. For example, if only 4% of blacks, hispanics, and whites were mistakenly
labeled as “other,” then this would nearly double the estimates for the “other” category
while having very little effects on the three major groups. (See Hemenway, 1997, for an
extended discussion of the problems that misclassifications can cause in estimates of a small
fraction of the population.) To give a sense of the data, we display in Figure 1 the number
of stops for blacks, hispanics, and whites over the fifteen-month period, separately showing
stops associated with each of four types of offenses (“suspected charges” as characterized
on the UF-250 form): violent crimes, weapons offenses, property crimes, and drug crimes.
In total, blacks and hispanics represented 51% and 33% of the stops, respectively, despite
being only 26% and 24%, respectively, of the city population based on the 1990 Census. (The
proportions change little if we use 1998 population estimates and count only males aged 15–
30, which is arguably a better baseline. For one of our supplementary analyses, we also use

9

the population for each ethnic group within each precinct in the city. Population estimates
for the police precincts with low residential populations but high daytime populations—
due to commercial and business activity—were adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau
“journey file,” provided by the New York City Department of City Planning (see Spitzer,
1999, Appendix I, Appendix Table 1.A.1a). The journey file uses algorithms based on
time traveled to work and the distribution of job classifications to estimate the day and
night populations of census tracts. Tracts were aggregated to their corresponding police
precinct to construct day and night population estimates, and separate stop estimates were
computed for day and night time intervals. For these analyses, we aggregated separate
estimates of stops by day and night to compute total stop rates for each precinct.)
Perhaps a more relevant comparison, however, is to the number of crimes committed
by members of each ethnic group. For example, then-New York City Police Commissioner
Howard Safir stated (Safir, 1999),
“The racial/ethnic distribution of the subjects of ‘stop’ and frisk reports reflects
the demographics of known violent crime suspects as reported by crime victims.
Similarly, the demographics of arrestees in violent crimes also correspond with
the demographics of known violent crime suspects.”
Data on actual crimes are not available, of course, so as a proxy we use the number
of arrests within New York City in the previous year, 1997, as recorded by the Division
of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) of New York State, as categorized by ethnic group
and crime type. These were deemed to be the best available measure of local crime rates
categorized by ethnicity, and they directly address concerns such as Safir’s that stop rates be
related to the ethnicity of crime suspects. We use the previous year’s DCJS arrest rates to
represent the frequency of crimes that the police might suspect were committed by members
of each ethnic group. When compared in that way, the ratio of stops to DCJS arrests was
1.24 for whites, 1.54 for blacks, and 1.72 for hispanics: based on this comparison, blacks
are stopped 23% and hispanics 39% more often than whites.

4

Models

The summaries so far describe average rates for the whole city. Suppose the police make
more stops in high-crime areas but treat the different ethnic groups equally within any
locality. Then the citywide ratios could show strong differences between ethnic groups even
if stops are entirely determined by location rather than ethnicity. In order to separate these
10

two kinds of predictors, we perform multilevel analyses using the city’s 75 precincts. Allowing precinct-level effects is consistent with theories of policing such as “broken windows”
that emphasize local, neighborhood-level strategies (Wilson and Kelling, 1982, Skogan,
1990). Because it is possible that the patterns are systematically different in neighborhoods
with different ethnic compositions, we divide the precincts into three categories in terms of
their black population: precincts that were less than 10% black, 10%–40% black, and over
40% black. We also account for variation in stop rates between the precincts within each
group. Each of the three categories represents roughly 1/3 of the precincts in the city, and
we perform separate analyses for each set.

4.1

Hierarchical Poisson regression model

For each ethnic group e = 1, 2, 3 and precinct p, we model the number of stops yep using an
overdispersed Poisson regression with indicators for ethnic groups, a hierarchical model for
precincts, and using nep , the number of DCJS arrests for that ethnic group in that precinct
(multiplied by 15/12 to scale to a fifteen-month period), as a baseline or offset:


µ+αe +βp +ep
n
e
yep ∼ Poisson 15
ep
12
βp ∼ N(0, σβ2 )
ep ∼ N(0, σ2 ),

(1)

where the coefficients αe (which we constrain to sum to 0) control for ethnic groups, the
βp ’s adjust for variation among precincts (with variance σβ ), and the ep ’s allow for overdispersion, that is, variation in the data beyond that explained by the Poisson model. We fit
the model using Bayesian inference with a noninformative uniform prior distribution on the
parameters µ, α, σβ , σ .
In classical generalized linear modeling or generalized estimating equations, overdispersion can be estimated using a χ2 statistic, with standard errors inflated by the square root of
the estimated overdispersion (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). In our analysis, we are already
using Bayesian inference to model the variation among precincts, and so the overdispersion
simply represents another variance component in the model; the resulting inferences indeed
have larger standard errors than would be obtained from the non-overdispersed regression
(which would correspond to σ = 0), and these posterior standard errors can be checked,
for example, using cross-validation of precincts.
Of most interest, however, are the exponentiated coefficients exp(αe ), which represent
relative rates of stops compared to arrests, after controlling for precinct. By comparing
11

stop rates to arrest rates, we can also separately analyze stops associated with different
sorts of crimes. We do separate comparisons for violent crimes, weapons offenses, property
crimes, and drug crimes. For each, we model the number of stops yep by ethnic group e
and precinct p for that crime type, using as a baseline the DCJS arrest count nep for that
ethnic group, precinct, and crime type. (The subsetting by crime type is implicit in this
notation; to keep notation simple we do not introduce an additional subscript for the four
categories of crime.)
We thus estimate model (1) for twelve separate subsets of the data, corresponding to the
four crime types and the three categories of precincts (less than 10% black population, 10–
40% black, and over 40% black). Computations were easily performed using the Bayesian
software Bugs (Spiegelhalter et al., 1994, 2003), which implements Markov chain Monte
Carlo simulation, as called from R (R Project, 2000, Sturtz, Ligges, and Gelman, 2005).
For each fit, we simulate three several independent Markov chains from different starting
points, stopping when the simulations from each chain alone are as variable as from all
the chains mixed together (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). We then gather the last half of the
simulated chains and us them to compute posterior estimates and standard errors. For the
analyses reported in this article, 10,000 iterations were always sufficient for mixing of the
sequences. We report inferences using posterior means and standard deviations, which are
reasonable summaries given the large sample size (see, e.g., Gelman et al., 2003, chapter 4).

4.2

Alternative model specifications

In addition to fitting model (1) as described above, we consider two forms of alternative
specifications, first fitting the same model but changing the batching of precincts, and
second altering the role played in the model by the previous year’s arrests. We compare the
fits under these alternative models to assess sensitivity to details of model specification.
Modeling variability across precincts
The batching of precincts into three categories is convenient and makes sense—neighborhoods with different levels of minority populations differ in many ways, including policing
strategies applied to each type (Fagan and Davies, 2000). Thus, fitting the model separately
to each group of precincts is a way to include contextual effects. However, there is an
arbitrariness to the division. We explore this by partitioning the precincts into different
numbers of categories and seeing how the model estimates change.
Another approach to controlling for systematic variation among precincts is to include
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precinct-level predictors, which can be included along with the individual precinct-level
effects in the multilevel model (see, e.g., Raudenbush and Bryk, 2000). As discussed earlier,
the precinct-level information that is of greatest interest, and also that has greatest potential
to affect our results, is the ethnic breakdown of the population. Thus we consider as
regression predictors the proportion black and hispanic in the precinct, replacing model (1)
by,
yep ∼ Poisson



µ+αe +ζ1 z1p +ζ2 z2p +βp +ep
15
12 nep e



,

(2)

where z1p and z2p represent the proportion of the population in precinct p that are black
and hispanic, respectively. We also consider variants of model (2) including the quadratic
2 , z 2 , and z z , to examine sensitivity to nonlinearity.
terms, z1p
1p 2p
2p

Modeling the relation of stops to previous year’s arrests
We also consider different ways of using the number of DCJS arrests nep in the previous
year, which plays the role of a baseline (or offset, in generalized linear models terminology)
in model (1). Including the past arrest rate as an offset makes sense since we are interested
in the rate of stops per crime, and we are using past arrests as a proxy for crime rate and
for police expectations about demographics of perpetrators. However, another option is to
include the logarithm of the number of past arrests as a linear predictor instead:


γ log nep +µ+αe +βp +ep
.
e
yep ∼ Poisson 15
12

(3)

Model (3) reduces to the offset-model (1) if γ = 1. We can thus fit (3) and see if the
inferences for αe change compared to the earlier model that implicitly fixes γ to 1.
We can take this idea further by modeling past arrests as a proxy of the actual crime
rate. We try this in two ways, for each labeling the true crime rate for each ethnicity in each
precinct as θep , with separate hierarchical Poisson regressions for this year’s stops and last
year’s arrests (as always, including the factor

15
12

to account for our 15 months of stop data).

In the first formulation, we model last year’s arrests as Poisson distributed with mean θ:


15
yep ∼ Poisson 12
θep eµ+αe +βp +ep
nep ∼ Poisson(θep )
log θep = log Nep + α̃e + β̃p + ˜ep .

(4)

Here we are using Nep , the population of ethnic group e in precinct p, as a baseline for
the model of crime frequencies. The second-level error terms β̃ and ˜ are given normal
hyperprior distributions as with model (1).
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Our second two-stage model is similar to (4) but moving the new error term ˜ to the
model for nep :
yep ∼ Poisson



µ+αe +βp +ep
15
12 θep e



nep ∼ Poisson(θep e˜ep )
log θep = log Nep + α̃e + β̃p .

(5)

Under this model, arrest rates nep are equal to the underlying crime rates, θep , on average,
but with overdispersion compared to the Poisson error distribution.

5

Results

5.1

Primary regression analysis

Table 1 shows the estimates from model (1) fit to each of four crime types in each of three
categories of precinct. The random-effects standard deviations σβ and σ are substantial,
indicating the relevance of hierarchical modeling for these data. (Recall that these effects
are all on the logarithmic scale, so that an effect of 0.3, for example, corresponds to a multiplicative effect of exp(0.3) = 1.35, or a 35% increase in the probability of being stopped.)
The parameters of most interest are the rates of stop (compared to previous year’s
arrests) for each ethnic group, eµ+αe , for e = 1, 2, 3. We display these graphically in Figure
2. Stops for violent crimes and weapons offenses were the most controversial aspect of the
stop-and-frisk policy (and represent over two-thirds of the stops) but for completeness we
display all four categories of crime here.
Figure 2 shows that, for the most frequent categories of stops—those associated with
violent crimes and weapons offenses—blacks and hispanics were much more likely to be
stopped than whites, in all categories of precincts. For violent crimes, blacks and hispanics
were stopped 2.5 times and 1.9 times as often as whites, respectively, and for weapons
crimes, blacks and hispanics were stopped 1.8 times and 1.6 times as often as whites. In the
less common categories of stop, whites were slightly more often stopped for property crimes
and more often stopped for drug crimes, in proportion to their previous year’s arrests in
any given precinct.

5.2

Alternative forms of the model

Fitting the alternative models described in Section 4.2 yielded similar results to our main
analysis. We discuss each alternative model in turn.
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Figure 3 displays the estimated rates of stops for violent crimes, compared to the previous
year’s arrests, for each of the three ethnic groups, for analyses dividing the precincts into
5, 10, and 15 categories ordered by percent black population in precinct. For simplicity, we
only give results for violent crimes; these are typical of the alternative analyses for all four
crime types. For each of the three graphs in Figure 3, the model was separately estimated
for each of the three groups of precincts, and these estimates are connected in a line for
each ethnic group. Compared to the upper-left plot in Figure 2, which shows the results
from dividing the precincts into three categories, we see that dividing into more groups adds
noise to the estimation but does not change the overall pattern of differences between the
groups.
Table 2 shows the results from model (2), which is fit to all 75 precincts but controls
for the proportion black and proportion hispanic in precincts. The inferences are similar to
those obtained from the main analysis discussed in Section 5.1. Including quadratic terms
and interactions in the precinct-level model (2), and including the precinct-level predictors
in the models fit to each of the three subsets of the data, similarly had little effect on the
parameters of interest, αe .
Table 3 displays parameter estimates from the models that differently incorporate the
previous year’s arrest rates nep . For conciseness we display results for violent crimes only,
and for simplicity we include all 75 precincts in the models. (Similar results are obtained
when fitting the model separately in each of three categories of precincts, and for the other
crime types.) The first two columns of Table 3 shows the result from our main model (1)
and the alternative model (3), which includes log nep as a regression predictor. The two
models differ only in that the first restricts γ to be 1, but as we can see, γ is estimated very
close to 1 in the regression formulation, and the coefficients αe are essentially unchanged.
(The intercept changes a bit because log nep does not have a mean of 0.)
The last two columns in Table 3 show the estimates from the two-stage regression models
(4) and (5). The models differ in their estimates of the variance parameters σβ and σ , but
the estimates of the key parameters αe are essentially the same in the original model.
We also performed analyses including indicators for the month of arrest. These analyses
did not add anything informative to the comparison of ethnic groups.

5.3

Hit rates: proportions of stops that led to arrests

A different way to compare ethnic groups is to look at the fraction of stops on the street
that lead to arrests. Most stops do not lead to arrests, and most arrests do not come from
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stops. In the analysis described above, we studied the rate at which the police stopped
people of different groups. Now we look briefly at what happens with these stops.
In the period for which we have data, 1 in 7.9 whites stopped were arrested, as compared
to approximately 1 in 8.8 hispanics and 1 in 9.5 blacks. These data are consistent with our
general conclusion that the police are disproportionately stopping minorities: the stops of
whites are more “efficient” and are more likely to lead to arrests, whereas for blacks and
hispanics, the police are stopping more indiscriminately, and fewer of the people stopped in
these broader sweeps are actually arrested. It is perfectly reasonable for the police to make
many stops that do not lead to arrests; the issue here is the comparison between ethnic
groups.
This can also be understood in terms of simple economic theory (following the reasoning
of Persico, Knowles, and Todd, 2001, for police stops for suspected drugs). It is reasonable
to suppose a diminishing return for stops in the sense that, at some point, little benefit will
be gained by stopping additional people. If the gain is approximately summarized by arrests,
then diminishing returns mean that the probability that a stop will lead to an arrest—in
economic terms, the marginal gain from stopping one more person—will decrease as the
number of people stopped increases. The stops of blacks and hispanics were less “efficient”
than those of whites, suggesting that the police have been using less rigorous standards when
stopping members of minority groups. We found similar results when separately analyzing
daytime and nighttime stops.
However, this “hit rate” analysis can be criticized as unfair to the police, who are
“damned if they do, damned if they don’t”: relatively few of the stops of minorities led to
arrests, and thus we conclude that police were more willing to stop minority group members
with less reason. But we could also make the argument the other way around: a relatively
high rate of whites stopped were arrested, so we could conclude that the police are biased
against whites in the sense of arresting them too often. Analyses that examined the validity
of arrests by race—that is, the proportion of arrests that lead to convictions–would help to
clarify this question. Unfortunately, such data are not readily available. We do not believe
this latter interpretation, but it is hard to rule it out from these data alone.
That is why we consider this part of the study to be only supporting evidence. Our main
analysis found that blacks and hispanics were stopped disproportionately often (compared
to their population or their crime rate, as measured by their rate of valid arrests in the
previous year), and the secondary analysis of the hit rates or “arrest efficiency” of these
stops is consistent with that finding.
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6

Discussion and conclusions

In the period for which we had data, the NYPD’s records indicate that they were stopping
blacks and hispanics more often than whites, both in comparison to the populations of
these groups and to the best estimates of the rate of crimes committed by each group.
After controlling for precincts, the pattern still holds. More specifically, for violent crimes
and weapons offenses, blacks and hispanics are stopped about twice as often as whites. In
contrast, for the less common stops for property and drug crimes, whites and hispanics are
more often stopped than blacks, in comparison to the arrest rate for each ethnic group.
A related piece of evidence is that stops of blacks and hispanics were less likely than those
of whites to lead to arrest, which suggests that the standards were more relaxed for stopping
minority group members. Two different scenarios might explain the lower “hit rates” for
non-whites, one which suggests targeting of minorities while another suggests dynamics
of racial stereotyping and a more passive form of racial preference. In the first scenario,
police possibly used wider discretion and more relaxed constitutional standards in deciding
to stop minority citizens. This explanation would conform to the scenario of “pretextual”
stops discussed in several recent studies of motor vehicle stops (for example, Lundman
and Kaufman, 2003), and suggests that higher stops rates were intentional and purposive.
Alternatively, police could also simply more often form the perception of “suspicion” based
on a broader interpretation of the social cues that capture police attention and evoke official
reactions (Alpert et al., 2005). The latter conforms more closely to a social psychological
process of racial stereotyping where the attribution of suspicion is more readily attached to
specific behaviors and contexts for minorities than it might be for whites (Thompson, 1999,
Richardson and Pittinski, 2005).
We did find evidence of stops that are best explained as “racial incongruity” stops:
high rates of minority stops in predominantly white precincts. Indeed, being “out of place”
often is one of the triggers for suspicion (Alpert et al., 2005; Gould and Mastrofski, 2004).
Racial incongruity stops are most prominent in racially homogeneous areas. For example,
we observed high stop rates of African Americans in the predominantly white 19th precinct,
a sign of race-based selection of citizens for police interdiction. We also observed high stop
rates for whites in several precincts in the Bronx, especially for drug crimes, most likely
evidence that white drug buyers were entering predominantly minority neighborhoods where
street drug markets were common. Overall, though, these were relatively infrequent events
that produced misleading stop rates due to the population skew in such precincts.
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To quickly summarize our findings: blacks and hispanics represented 51% and 33% of
the stops although representing only 26% and 24% of the New York City population. In
comparison to the number of arrests of each group in the previous year (used as a proxy
for the rate of criminal behavior), blacks were stopped 23% and hispanics 39% more often
than whites. Controlling for precinct actually increased these discrepancies, with minorities
between 1.5 and 2.5 times as often as whites (compared to the groups’ previous arrest
rates in the precincts where they were stopped) for the most common categories of stops
(violent crimes and drug crimes), with smaller differences for property and drug crimes.
The differences in stop rates among ethnic groups are real, they are substantial, and they
are not explained by previous arrest rates or precincts.
Our findings do not necessarily imply the NYPD was acting in an unfair or racist manner,
however. It is quite reasonable to suppose that effective policing requires many people to
be stopped and questioned in order to gather information about any given crime.
In the context of some difficult relations between the police and ethnic minority communities in New York City, it is useful to have some quantitative sense of the issues under
dispute. Given that there have been complaints about the frequency with which the police
have been stopping blacks and hispanics, it is relevant to know that this is indeed a statistical pattern. The police department then has the opportunity to explain their policies to
the affected communities.
In the years since this study was conducted, an extensive monitoring system was put
into place that would accomplish two goals. First, procedures were developed and implemented that permitted monitoring of officers’ compliance with the mandates of the NYPD
Patrol Guide for accurate and comprehensive recording of all police stops. Second, the new
forms were entered into databases that would permit continuous monitoring of the racial
proportionality of stops and their outcomes (frisks, arrests). When coupled with accurate
reporting on race-specific measures of crime and arrest, the new procedures and monitoring
requirements will ensure that inquiries similar to this study can be institutionalized as part
of a framework of accountability mechanisms.
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Proportion
black
in precinct
< 10%

10–40%

> 40%

Parameter
intercept
α1 [blacks]
α2 [hispanics]
α3 [whites]
σβ
σ
intercept
α1 [blacks]
α2 [hispanics]
α3 [whites]
σβ
σ
intercept
α1 [blacks]
α2 [hispanics]
α3 [whites]
σβ
σ

Violent
−0.85 (0.07)
0.40 (0.06)
0.13 (0.06)
−0.53 (0.06)
0.33 (0.08)
0.30 (0.04)
−0.97 (0.07)
0.38 (0.04)
0.08 (0.04)
−0.46 (0.04)
0.49 (0.07)
0.24 (0.03)
−1.58 (0.10)
0.44 (0.06)
0.11 (0.06)
−0.55 (0.08)
0.48 (0.10)
0.24 (0.05)

Crime
Weapons
0.13 (0.07)
0.16 (0.05)
0.12 (0.04)
−0.28 (0.05)
0.38 (0.08)
0.23 (0.04)
0.42 (0.07)
0.24 (0.04)
0.13 (0.04)
−0.36 (0.04)
0.47 (0.07)
0.24 (0.03)
0.29 (0.11)
0.30 (0.07)
0.14 (0.07)
−0.44 (0.08)
0.47 (0.11)
0.37 (0.05)

type
Property
−0.58 (0.21)
−0.32 (0.06)
0.32 (0.06)
0.00 (0.06)
1.19 (0.20)
0.32 (0.04)
−0.89 (0.16)
−0.16 (0.06)
0.25 (0.06)
−0.08 (0.06)
1.21 (0.17)
0.38 (0.04)
−1.15 (0.19)
−0.03 (0.07)
0.04 (0.07)
−0.01 (0.07)
0.96 (0.18)
0.42 (0.07)

Drug
−1.62 (0.16)
−0.08 (0.09)
0.17 (0.10)
−0.08 (0.09)
0.87 (0.16)
0.50 (0.07)
−1.87 (0.13)
−0.05 (0.05)
0.12 (0.06)
−0.07 (0.05)
0.90 (0.13)
0.32 (0.04)
−2.62 (0.12)
0.09 (0.06)
0.09 (0.07)
−0.18 (0.09)
0.54 (0.11)
0.28 (0.06)

Table 1: Estimates and standard errors for the constant term µ, ethnicity parameters αe ,
and the precinct-level and precinct-by-ethnicity level variance parameters σβ and σ , for
the hierarchical Poisson regression model (1), fit separately to three categories of precinct
and four crime types. The estimates of eµ+αe are displayed graphically in Figure 2, and
alternative model specifications are shown in Table 3.
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Parameter
intercept
α1 [blacks]
α2 [hispanics]
α3 [whites]
ζ1 [coeff for prop. black]
ζ2 [coeff for prop. hispanic]
σβ
σ

Violent
−0.66 (0.08)
0.41 (0.03)
0.10 (0.03)
−0.51 (0.03)
−1.22 (0.18)
−0.33 (0.23)
0.40 (0.04)
0.25 (0.02)

Crime
Weapons
0.08 (0.11)
0.24 (0.03)
0.12 (0.03)
−0.36 (0.03)
0.10 (0.19)
0.71 (0.27)
0.43 (0.04)
0.27 (0.02)

type
Property
−0.14 (0.24)
−0.19 (0.04)
0.23 (0.04)
−0.05 (0.04)
−1.11 (0.45)
−1.50 (0.57)
1.04 (0.09)
0.37 (0.03)

Drug
−0.98 (0.17)
−0.02 (0.04)
0.15 (0.04)
−0.13 (0.04)
−1.71 (0.31)
−1.89 (0.41)
0.68 (0.06)
0.37 (0.03)

Table 2: Estimates and standard errors for the parameters of model (2) that includes
proportion black and hispanic as precinct-level predictors, fit to all 75 precincts. The
results for the parameters of interest, αe , are similar to those obtained by fitting the basic
model separately to each of three categories of precincts, as displayed in Table 1 and Figure
2. As before, the model is fit separately to the data from four different crime types.

Parameter
intercept
α1 [blacks]
α2 [hispanics]
α3 [whites]
γ [coeff for log nep ]
σβ
σ

Model for previous year’s arrests
regression (3) two-stage (4) two-stage (5)
−0.94 (0.16) −1.07 (0.06) −1.13 (0.07)
0.41 (0.03)
0.40 (0.03)
0.42 (0.08)
0.10 (0.03)
0.10 (0.03)
0.14 (0.09)
−0.51 (0.03) −0.50 (0.03) −0.56 (0.09)
0.97 (0.03)
0.51 (0.05)
0.51 (0.05)
0.51 (0.05)
0.27 (0.12)
0.26 (0.02)
0.26 (0.02)
0.24 (0.02)
0.67 (0.04)

offset (1)
−1.08 (0.06)
0.40 (0.03)
0.10 (0.03)
−0.50 (0.03)

Table 3: Estimates and standard errors for parameters under model (1) and three alternative
specifications for the previous year’s arrests nep : treating log(nep ) as a predictor in the
Poisson regression model (3), and the two-stage models (4) and (5). For simplicity, results
are displayed for violent crimes only, for the model fit to all 75 precincts. The three αe
parameters are nearly identical under all four models, with the specification affecting only
the intercept.
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Figure 1: Number of police stops in each of 15 months, characterized by type of crime
and ethnicity of person stopped. In each graph, blacks (African-Americans), hispanics
(Latinos), and whites (European-Americans) are indicated by solid, dashed, and dotted
lines, respectively.
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Figure 2: Estimated rates eµ+αe at which people of different ethnic groups were stopped for
different categories of crime, as estimated from hierarchical regressions (1) using previous
year’s arrests as a baseline and controlling for differences between precincts. Separate
analyses were done for the precincts that had less than 10%, 10%–40%, and more than
40% black population. For the most common stops—violent crimes and weapons offenses—
blacks and hispanics were stopped about twice as often as whites. Rates are plotted on a
logarithmic scale. Numerical estimates and standard errors appear in Table 1.
15 groups of precincts

precinct groups in increasing order of % black

Figure 3: Estimated rates eµ+αe at which people of different ethnic groups were stopped for
violent crimes, as estimated from models dividing precincts into 5, 10, and 15 categories.
For each graph, the top, middle, and lower lines correspond to blacks, hispanics, and whites,
respectively. These plots show the same general patterns as the model with 3 categories
(the upper-left graph in Figure 2) but with increasing levels of noise.
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